Dalege, Borsboom, van Harreveld, and van der Maas (this issue) describe a novel framework for the conceptualization of attitudes that draws on principles from statistical mechanics. A core idea in their framework is that systems are often characterized by randomness (i.e., entropy) and that there is both heuristic and predictive value in applying the idea of entropy to the study of attitudes and related phenomena. We applaud their initiative: the attitudinal entropy framework provides an intriguing new perspective on theoretical questions and empirical findings in social psychology. It opens up new avenues for research in many areas and is a timely contribution given the growing popularity of predictive processing theories emphasizing entropy as an important factor in human cognition (for a recent overview see Metzinger & Wiese, 2017).
1 Note that the explanatory value of entropy reduction at the functional level hinges upon the ability to manipulate directly the entropy of State Y. To the extent that the entropy of State Y can be manipulated only indirectly by manipulating elements in the environment, it makes more sense to say that State X is a function of those elements in the environment and that the entropy of State Y mediates the functional relation between the elements in the environment and State X (see Hayes & Brownstein, 1986 , for a related discussion).
provide a direct and accurate reflection of mental representations (Schwarz, 2007) , one can treat them as behaviors, much like any other movement of muscles or glands can be treated as a behavior. Within the domain of attitude research this would, for instance, imply that an inconsistency between self-reported liking of a product and buying behavior is not treated as an attitude-behavior inconsistency (which implies that self-reported liking is a proxy of the underlying mental attitude) but as a behavior-behavior inconsistency.
This perspective is compatible with the idea that attitude research deals with the study of evaluation, that is, the way in which stimuli influence evaluative responses (De Houwer, 2009;  De Houwer, Gawronski, & Barnes-Holmes, 2013) . It implies that both the CAN model and the Attitudinal Entropy Framework have much to contribute to attitude research. One of the big assets of network models such as the CAN model is that they provide new ways of describing relations between (evaluative) behaviors. To the extent that the relations between behaviors in a network are assumed to be directional (rather than merely correlational), networks also provide functional explanations of behavior, that is, insights into how one behavior is a function of other behaviors or states in the environment. Such functional explanations allow one to predict and influence behavior by observing and influencing other behavior or states in the environment.
2
The integration of the CAN model within an entropy framework further expands the descriptive and functional explanatory value of the CAN model by linking it with concepts such as entropy and entropy reduction. Note, however, that all of this can be achieved without invoking any reference to mental constructs such as mental representations. In fact, this conclusion is -unsurprising given that both entropy frameworks and network models have been developed in areas of research such as physics and mathematics that focus on description and functional explanations.
One might argue that the Attitudinal Entropy Framework could in principle also be applied at the cognitive level of explanation by using it to describe and explain the nature of mental representations. The problem with this approach is that (the elements of) mental representations cannot be observed directly (Gardner, 1987) . Hence, applying the framework at the cognitive level necessarily adds a level of uncertainty compared to when the framework is restricted to the descriptive or functional level. We therefore believe that there are advantages to applying the framework at the descriptive and functional level as compared to the cognitive level.
Regardless of the level of explanation at which the framework is likely to be most successful, it would be good to always be explicit about the level of explanation at which the framework is Of course, our analysis does not imply that one should abandon the cognitive level of explanation in attitude research. We only argue that attitude research which focusses on description and functional explanation also has merit and that the Attitudinal Entropy Framework can contribute to attitude research at those levels. Such research can be complemented by theories about the mental mechanisms that mediate evaluation. In fact, Dalege et al. (this issue) seem to be aware of this fact when they refer to the need to understand the inferences that underlie the links in networks and the motivational processes that determine the dependency within networks. As we will argue below, there is indeed much merit in considering the role of motivation and inferential processes in attitude research. Although theories about mediating mental mechanisms can certainly be related to the Attitudinal Entropy Framework, much of the scientific merit of the framework itself is, in our opinion, situated at the descriptive level and functional level of explanation.
Limitations of the Attitudinal Entropy Framework
Despite its merits, the Attitudinal Entropy Framework as it was put forward by Dalege and colleagues is also limited in important ways. First, attitude elements are modeled as nodes that can only be switched on or off and are thus stripped from any (relational) content (e.g., the content of beliefs), making it difficult to see how consistency between attitude elements could be determined. The assumption that only the (momentary) valence of attitude elements (modeled as a binary variable) is compared in this process is unfeasible given that it is not specified how the valence of attitude elements (not only beliefs but also behaviors and feelings) is determined.
Moreover, studies show that content-related characteristics of information about attitude objects (e.g., its diagnosticity or believability: Cone, Mann, & Ferguson, 2018) determine evaluation more than the amount of positive and negative information. For instance, Cone and Ferguson (2015) found that participants exhibited negative rather than positive implicit and explicit evaluations of a person named Bob when they learned many pieces of positive information about Bob but only one piece of negative information that was, however, more diagnostic of Bob's true character (e.g., that Bob was a child molester).
Second, as noted earlier, Dalege and colleagues refer to cognitive concepts such as inferences and motivation. However, their treatment of these concepts is rather superficial. With regard to the concept of motivation, they argue that the mental system is motivated to reduce entropy because that entropy causes distress. However, without an explanation of the motivational role of entropy, the current framework pushes the question of attitudes back from explaining attitudes to explaining entropy and distress. Note that modeling of entropy (described as consistency detection) does not solve this issue because this modeling is also merely descriptive and does not directly tie into important mental level concepts.
In the remainder of this section, we discuss in quite some detail the role of inferential processes within the Attitudinal Entropy Framework. Whereas Dalege and colleagues (this issue) refer to this topic only briefly, we believe that inferential processes are vital when extending the framework to the cognitive level of explanation. In a recent paper, we described an inferential account of evaluative stimulus-action effects that focuses on the inferences that underlie evaluative learning on the basis of stimulus-based actions (e.g., repeated approach or avoidance of a stimulus) and outlines how these inferences might arise based on predictive processing principles (Van Dessel, Hughes, & De Houwer, in press).
3 Specifically, evaluative responding is considered to result from inferences about (the value of) action outcomes. These inferences are learning-, context, and goal-dependent, and reflect the (automatic) application of inference rules -to activated information on the basis of a person's belief network (which can be seen as a generative model of the world that is continuously updated on the basis of available information).
The Attitudinal Entropy framework and our inferential model share several similarities with one another. For instance, the former argues that entropy (and its reduction) may play a key role determining the structure and properties of attitudes, a claim that is certainly compatible with the inferential account given its incorporation of predictive processing theory (Friston, 2010) .
Second, the Attitudinal Entropy framework seems to share the position that implicit and explicit attitudes are based on a single type of mental process that involves inferential reasoning. For instance, Dalege and colleagues note that "weights between attitude elements generally arise based on inferences" (p.12). Moreover, assessing for entropy (which they conceptualize in part as consistency between attitude elements) presumably requires the mental system to be able to represent the truth value of attitude elements (and relations between these elements). This (Friston, 2010) . However, we only briefly refer to entropy in the inferential theory we described. Moreover, it has been noted that the conceptualization of entropy in the predictive processing framework is implausible and requires more work (e.g., Otworowska, Van Rooij, & Kwisthout, 2018) . In the spirit of the attitudinal entropy model, it might be useful to provide a more extensive description of entropy. For instance, entropy could be more clearly defined as a factor that determines the circumstances under which a person's belief system is updated. We could model entropy as the extent to which integration of information is difficult in that it requires more extensive updating of probabilities in the model. Other variables such as inferred value of information (e.g., for our survival or our self-concept) might be included in this calculation such that entropy is not the only principle that determines inferences and belief updating (which seems problematic: Otworowska et al., 2018) . Such modeling that is tied to tangible mental constructs in a model that clearly separates levels of explanation might provide a clear contribution to the literature (e.g., in terms of its explanatory value).
Predictions Tested
While this commentary has primarily focused on conceptual matters, we also had the opportunity to test two of the framework's predictions that Dalege and colleagues argue flow from their model with data we already had at hand. We used data from the Attitudes 2.0 dataset (Hussey et al., 2018) to assess predictions number 1b and 3. Data to test other predictions was not at hand. This large dataset (number of experimental sessions > 409,000) represents a single large study of implicit and explicit attitudes that was conducted on the Project Implicit website (https://implicit.harvard.edu). Subsets of this dataset have been used in previous research (e.g., Nosek & Hansen, 2008) , and the full dataset is being curated for public release and publication (Hussey et al., 2018) . We employed these items to assess the hypothesis that deliberative evaluations are more extreme (i.e., polarized) than gut evaluations. Self-report ratings for each evaluation type were recoded as absolute scores, so that positive scores represent deviation from neutrality/ambivalence without regard to whether those evaluations were positive or negative. A mixed-effects linear regression model that accounted for the nesting of evaluations within concept category domains (i.e., random intercept for domain and random slope for rating type) demonstrated evidence against this prediction: "deliberative" evaluations were found to be less extreme on average than "gut" evaluations (B = -0.16, 95% CI = [-0.18, -0.14], β = -0.07, 95% CI = [-0.08, -0.06], p < .001, R 2 = 0.004). As such, analyses using a very large existing dataset provide supportive evidence for one prediction that Dalege and colleagues put forth for the framework, however an effect in the opposite direction to that predicted was found for another prediction. Additional tests of the authors' other predictions are of course warranted.
Concluding Remarks
The Attitudinal Entropy framework interfaces concepts from statistical mechanics (entropy) and social psychology (attitudes) to offer an intriguing new perspective on the latter that has both heuristic and predictive value, as evidenced by support for one of the frameworks' predictions that we were able to test with data at hand. Unlike Dalege and colleagues (this issue), we believe that the main scientific contribution of the framework, as put forward in their paper, is situated at the descriptive level and the functional level of explanation rather than the cognitive level of explanation. Nevertheless, the framework can be strengthened at the cognitive level of explanation, most prominently by incorporating more precise assumptions about the nature and role of inferential processes. Provided that researchers distinguish between the different levels of explanation to which the Attitudinal Entropy Framework contributes, the framework can provide a major step forward in attitude research.
